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THE REFORMED THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

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THE
REFORMED
THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

Vol. XIII, No. 2 JUNE, 1954

Apostleship and Apostolic Succession

What is the ground of apostleship in the New Testament? Are the qualifications of an apostle the same in every case? And—a question strictly preliminary to these two—who, in fact, were regarded as apostles in the New Testament church?

Rengstorf (*apostolos* in TWNT vol. 1, pa. 432) concludes that the two grounds of apostleship are an encounter with the Risen Christ together with a personal commission from him.

G. W. H. Lampe, in his valuable monograph, "Some Aspects of the New Testament Ministry" (S.P.C.K. 1949), endorses the view of Karl Holl "that all those who are called 'apostles' in the New Testament, other than the deputies of churches, were especially commissioned by Christ after the Resurrection" (p. 13).

In one of the most recent discussions of the matter, J. Norval Geldenhuys ("Supreme Authority," Marshall, Morgan and Scott, 1953) reaches the same conclusion as the foregoing.

These three writers differ, however, in their views as to who were, in fact, *apostoloi* in the N.T. Rengstorf thinks that the number of apostles, even apart from the Twelve, may have been considerable. He would include Barnabas, James, Junias and Andronicus (but not Apollos or Timothy) among their number. Lampe does not speculate on the number of apostles outside the Twelve. He thinks that "on the whole, the use of *apostolos* to denote any travelling missionary, without further qualifications, would seem to be a post-canonical development." Geldenhuys will have only the Twelve and Paul as apostles. Barnabas he can only regard as an apostle in the sense of a deputy of a church (a view which Lampe thinks "conceivable"), and Andronicus and Junias likewise, though he doubts whether this is the right interpretation of Romans 16:7.

This disagreement as to who *are* regarded as *apostoloi* in the N.T. is surprising, and there seem to be grounds for examining the question again, especially as there are some passages in the N.T. which are consistently overlooked by most investigators.

WHO WERE THE APOSTLES?

There is no question that the Twelve were called *apostoloi,* as was also Paul. The ground of the apostleship of the Twelve was (a) their having been with Jesus from the baptism of John to the Ascension, (b) their being witnesses of the Resurrection, and (c) their being personally commissioned by the Risen Christ. It should be noted, however, that whereas eleven of them were commissioned by Christ either during his earthly life or during the forty days of his resurrection appearances, one of them, Matthias, was chosen for his apostleship *after* the ascension and not at a personal encounter with the Lord (Acts 1:24-26). The ground of Paul's apostleship was different. He lacked the first qualification of the Twelve, and he was not, like Matthias, "numbered with" the other apostles at the instigation of Peter or any one else. He owed his apostleship to the direct commissioning of the Risen Christ who appeared to him, "as to one born out of due time," for that purpose.

But from here our troubles begin. Let us analyse our problem:

1. Were any other men besides the Twelve and Paul called, or regarded as, *apostoloi?*
2. If so, can it be demonstrated that they, like the Twelve (or at least the Eleven) and Paul, were personally commissioned by the Risen Christ?
3. If this cannot be demonstrated, what other ground is there for their apostleship?

We can dismiss at once the men called *apostoloi* of churches, such as are mentioned in 2 Cor. 8:23 and Phil. 2.25 for example. These men are purely deputies of churches, are clearly described as such, and their job, which is not a permanent one, is to act in some particular matter on behalf of the church which authorises them.

But there are other cases for consideration. First is Barnabas, whose case is a test case. He and Paul are unequivocally called *apostoloi* together by Luke in Acts 14:4 and 14. Geldenhuys argues that he is an *apostolos* of the church at Antioch, but apart from the exigencies of Geldenhuys' preconceived theory of apostleship there is no reason for thinking this. Luke himself tells us that Barnabas

and Paul were appointed to their work by the Holy Spirit (Acts 13:2). They were not acting on behalf of the church of Antioch. Moreover, Paul himself by implication calls Barnabas an *apostolos* in I Cor. 9 when he says "Have we no right to lead about a wife . . . even as the rest of the apostles . . ? Or only I and Barnabas, have we not a right to forbear working?" Likewise in Gal. 2:9 he speaks of Barnabas, as Lightfoot puts it, "as associated with himself in the apostleship of the Gentiles."

So Barnabas is an *apostolos*. On what grounds? It has been suggested that, like Paul, he must have seen the Lord and been commissioned by him. But this is a gratuitous assumption. Not only is there no hint of any such thing, but our introduction to Barnabas in Acts 4.36—as a Cypriote Levite who was one of the "multitude of them that believed," who was surnamed by the apostles and who laid the price of land he had sold at the apostles' feet—strongly suggests that he was a new convert. At all events he is clearly distinguished from "the apostles" at that time.

Are there any other grounds on which Barnabas' apostleship might be based? We think that the following facts are relevant:—

1. He received authorisation for his missionary labours from the Holy Spirit (Acts 13:2).
2. He was engaged in missionary work of an identical character with that of Paul whom we know on other grounds to have been an *apostolos* for precisely that purpose. Indeed he was senior partner to Paul in that work.
3. He continued his missionary work, with no apparent change in its character, even after his separation from Paul.

Thus it is at least open to us to consider the hypothesis that the fact of having the Holy Spirit's guidance, together with the fact of carrying out that guidance in actual missionary preaching, were sufficient grounds for regarding a man as an *apostolos*. We have seen that Lampe holds that "on the whole, the use of *apostolos* to denote any travelling missionary, without further qualifications, would seem to be a post-canonical development" (op. cit. p.13f). But the case of Barnabas would suggest that *apostolos* was already used in the N.T. of missionaries other than the Twelve and Paul.

Let us test this hypothesis in the rest of the N.T.

OTHER APOSTLES.

One of Paul's earliest epistles is the first to the Thessalonians. He begins: "Paul, Silvanus and Timothy to the church of the Thessalonians" and at once begins to talk about the original visit which the three of them made to Philippi when the gospel was first preached and the church founded. He speaks in detail of their behaviour and methods of working. In the course of this he says: "nor did we seek glory from men, whether from you or from others, though we might have made demands as apostles of Christ." The context—the recital of events in which Silvanus and Timothy in fact took part—precludes the possibility that Paul is here merely employing a conventional epistolary plural. Other plurals in this passage are true plurals (e.g., v. 9) and when Paul does want to emphasise his personal sentiments he is quite capable of doing so (e.g., v. 18). We are left with the strong presumption that Paul is here content to regard, and to let the Thessalonians regard, Silvanus and Timothy as "apostles of Christ" along with himself.

Another point is relevant here. Why is it that, both here and I Cor. 9, Paul considers "apostles of Christ" to have certain rights in the matter of support from those to whom they minister? Paul himself answers this question. The Lord himself, he says, had commanded that "they who proclaim the gospel should get their living from the gospel" (I Cor. 9:14). This suggests that Paul's criterion of apostleship in these passages is *simply* the activity of preaching the gospel as missionaries. This would qualify Silas and Timothy for such a title, and enable also a wider interpretation to be given to "the other apostles" in 1 Cor. 11 and 12.

In saying that Paul's criterion of apostleship in these passages is *simply* the activity of preaching, we must add that this carries the proviso that it must be the genuine gospel that is preached. Here the instructive passage, which goes far to substantiate the hypothesis about the ground of apostleship which we have advanced, is 2 Cor. 11 and 12.

Twice in these chapters Paul speaks of the "chiefest" or "superlative" apostles. To whom is he referring? Not to the Twelve (11:13). Some other group of men whom the Corinthians knew were described as *apostoloi*, and whatever epithets Paul might use to describe them, the term *apostoloi* is still there. What we have to ask is, why were

they called *apostoloi,* and on what grounds does Paul condemn them and finally call them *pseudapostoloi?* We may assume at once that they were called *apostoloi* simply because they were missionary preachers; it is incredible that Paul would have called them false apostles if they had been personally commissioned by Christ. At the same time, Paul does not condemn them on the ground that they had *not* been so commissioned, as we might expect him to have done if that were his criterion of apostleship. Rather does he condemn them because they preached another *euaggelion.* Paul argues from the genuineness of the *euaggelion* to the validity of the apostleship and not vice-versa. The whole incident supplies proof that at that time *apostolos* meant missionary preacher. Paul's only proviso was that the mark of the genuineness of such *apostoloi* was in their message.

The same situation is reflected in Rev. 2:2 where the place is Ephesus. This verse refers to those who "call themselve apostles and are not" but are found to be false. This is not simply that they claimed to have been commissioned by Christ, but had not. Rather their claim to apostleship is refuted on the ground that they are "evil men" whose lives do not square with the genuine gospel. But their very existence, as at Corinth, implies that there may well have been a number of genuine *apostoloi* engaged in missionary labours in both Europe and Asia at this time.

We may mention here that the reference in 2 Peter 2:3 to "your apostles" is, in our judgment, to be interpreted as meaning "those who brought the gospel to you." In this it differs significantly from the parallel passage in Jude where the phrase is "the apostles of our Lord Jesus Christ" and probably means the Twelve.

APOLLOS, ANDRONICUS AND JUNIAS.

Three other men who were not, like Barnabas, Silvanus and Timothy, directly associated with Paul in his missionary labours, and yet who are probably classed as apostles in the N.T., should be considered.

In 1 Cor. 4 Paul begins: "This is how one should regard us, as servants of Christ, and stewards of the mysteries of God," and he explains in verse 6: "I have applied all this to myself and Apollos for your benefit, brethren," and, continuing in the same strain and context, exclaims "For I think that God has exhibited us apostles last . . ." Since the whole passage shows that Paul acknowledged Apollos to be engaged in the same vital ministry as

himself (both are "servants through whom you believed") can we resist the conclusion that Paul includes Apollos in the designation "us apostles"? Prof. F. W. Grosheide, in his recent commentary on 1 Corinthians, concurs that *apostoloi* here is to be "taken in its broader sense of all preachers of the gospel."

The commonest interpretation of Romans 16:7 is that Andronicus and Junias are to be regarded as notable representatives of the class of people known as *apostoloi.* (The other possible interpretation, that these two were regarded as notable by the Twelve, is hard to justify on grounds of relevance here.) As to the grounds of their apostleship, we can only speculate that, since they were Jews who were "in Christ" before Paul, they were among the members of the Jerusalem church who were scattered because of the persecution that arose over Stephen and who "went about preaching the word." Perhaps they brought the gospel to Rome. As itinerant missionaries, they, and others like them, were *apostoloi.* (Incidentally, if Junias is a woman, apostleship must be reckoned among the ministries which it is open to women to perform, at least with their husbands, unlike the ministry of *episcope* or of teaching in the congregation.)

Our conclusions thus far may be summarised thus:

1. Besides the apostleship of the Twelve, and the apostleship of Paul, we have, in the central stream of N.T. life and teaching, another form of apostleship which does not derive from witness to the life and teaching of Christ, nor from witness to his resurrection, nor from personal commissioning by the Risen Christ.

2. This apostleship is grounded in the preaching of the genuine gospel, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, whether in association with Paul or independently of Paul's mission.

3. The number of *apostoloi* apart from the Twelve and Paul in the N.T. was quite large, and included Barnabas, Silas, Timothy, Apollos, Andronicus and Junias.

PAUL'S COLLEAGUES IN APOSTLESHIP.

Before proceeding further we must deal with an objection which is sure to be raised by some, namely, that Paul's self-designation in his epistles ("Paul an apostle of Jesus Christ and Sosthenes our brother") argues in favour of his having held an exclusive view of apostleship, i.e., that whereas he himself was an apostle, Sosthenes (or Timothy) was not.

Now nobody will deny that Paul knew himself to have a peculiar claim to apostleship by reason of his encounter with the Risen Christ "as one born out of due time," and to have a peculiar status and responsibility in the gentile mission. It is no surprise therefore that he should make a distinction between himself and others when stating his own credentials. Yet it does not follow from this that he would necessarily deny the designation of *apostolos* to others. Paul's unique claim is not to apostleship simply, but to the special status of his apostleship. Moreover, Paul's self-designation is not so rigid as is sometimes supposed. Twice to the Thessalonians he writes, "Paul, Silvanus and Timothy," without distinction. To the Philippians, "Paul and Timothy, servants of Jesus Christ." To Philemon, "Paul a prisoner of Jesus Christ and Timothy our brother." He conjoins no name with his own in Romans, Galatians, Ephesians Timothy I and II and Titus. Our question is raised by three letters only. In I Corinthians he writes, "Paul, called by the will of God to be an apostle of Jesus Christ, and Sosthenes the brother," and in II Corinthians and Colossians, "Paul, an apostle of Jesus Christ by the will of God, and Timothy the brother." This formula certainly provides a distinction between Paul and Sosthenes or Timothy, a distinction which enables Paul to assert his own right to apostleship independently of any other man. But it does not exclude the other men from apostleship as such. One may even argue that it confirms the apostleship of the others after its kind. For what, after all, is meant by the term which is the accompanying designation in each case, "the brother"? The definite article, which is absent from *apostolos,* must mean something; the phrase does not mean simply "one of the brethren," i.e., a member of the Christian society. The definite article could signify, as Robertson and Plummer assert it does, that Sosthenes (Timothy) is well known to some at Corinth (Colossae). On the other hand, we suggest it signifies that Sosthenes (Timothy) is *Paul's* brother, i.e., in this context, his fellow or colleague in apostleship. (*Adelphos* in the sense of colleague is possible in 1 Cor. 16:12, 2 Cor. 2:13, 8:18, 12.18; Eph. 6:21, Phil. 2.25, Col. 4:7, 1 Thess. 3:2, 1 Peter 5:12, etc.)

APOSTOLIC SUCCESSION.

We are now in a position to put a question which is of great relevance to-day: Have the functions of the N.T. apostles passed to others? Is there such a thing as apostolic succession?

So that we do not argue about words, it should be said at once that what Anglo-Catholics mean by Apostolic Succession is not apostolic succession at all, for it is not concerned with succession in the ministry of apostleship, but with succession in the ministry of *episcope,* or oversight in the congregation. The ministry of apostleship is the ministry of going into all the world and preaching the gospel. It is concerned with the expansion of the church. Apostolic succession should mean the succession of those who fulfil the ministry of apostleship. Whether or not it is part of the ministry of apostleship to ordain elders in the churches which are brought into being by the apostle's preaching is another question. We may think it likely. But here we are discussing succession in apostleship itself.

What we should not overlook is that there is already an apostolic succession in the N.T. There are the original Twelve apostles, there is James the Lord's brother who is an apostle (Gal. 1:19), there are Andronicus and Junias and Barnabas, there is Paul, there is Apollos, there are Silas and Timothy, colleagues of Paul, and there is a large band of other apostles going everywhere preaching the word. These men did not receive manumission of apostleship from one another. The *peculiar* function of the Twelve, their witness to the life, teaching and resurrection of Jesus Christ, was in the nature of things non-transferable. Whether or not the Twelve appointed others to take their place in their strictly apostolic function of preaching the gospel in all the world, we simply do not know. Certainly we know that some men called *apostoloi* were not appointed by them, and we have no right to assume that others were.

When Paul is discussing apostleship as the first of the ministries God has given to the church, there is no reaon to think that he is thinking of the Twelve only and himself as fulfilling this ministry. It is much more likely that he is thinking of those people whose function in the church, in any church, is indispensible for its foundation. In Ephesians in particular he is thinking of those men through whose foundation labours the gentiles were being brought into the household of God. Here we must note that certain churches even in N.T. times were founded by men other than the Twelve or Paul, some of whom at least we have no reason to suppose were set apart for the work by any previous apostle. Was not the church at Antioch founded by "apostles and prophets" other than the Twelve? Were not the churches of Cyprus built on the foundation of unnamed missionaries from Jerusalem and Barnabas?

Were not the churches of Colossae and Laodicea founded by Epaphras and others?

Romans 10:14 is of importance for Paul's conception of apostleship and the real reason for its priority among the ministries of the gospel. Paul here uses the verb *apostellein*, but we may reasonably surmise that he has the noun in mind. The *apostolos* is here viewed from the point of view, not of his prerogative or status or privilege, but from the point of view of his place in the economy of salvation and of the world mission. Neither his call nor his commission is stressed. A vast gentile world needs the salvation which comes by hearing the word of Christ. This can only come by belief. How can belief come unles there are preachers? This can only come about in turn—here Paul reaches the climax of his argument—if there are *apostoloi*. What *apostoloi* has Paul in mind? All who preach or will preach the glorious gospel of the blessed God to those who have not heard it. He simply quotes the Isaianic prophecy, "How beautiful are the feet of those who preach good things." He might well have added, "The Lord gave the word; great was the company of the preachers."

We cannot believe that the ministry of apostleship was something which belonged only to the first generation of the church and is no longer exercised to-day, for churches are still brought into being through the preaching of the Word of God by the lips of messengers. Nor are we permitted either by the evidence of the New Testament or of actual experience down the centuries, to hold that the ministry of apostleship is exercised only by men who have received their commission to preach from someone who can trace directly back to the first apostles the manumission of his authority.

If any man to-day wishes to know if he is in the apostolic succession, he must ask himself the following questions: Am I performing the ministry of apostleship, i.e., am I preaching the gospel to those who have not heard it? Have I been authorised by the Holy Spirit for this ministry? Is the gospel I preach the genuine gospel which the first apostles preached?

If any church or congregation to-day would regard itself as apostolic, it must likewise ask itself whether it cherishes the apostolic gospel and doctrine, defending it from falsehood and corruption, whether it is active in praying the Lord of the harvest to send forth labourers into his harvest, and whether from its own number men

are being separated for the missionary work to which the Holy Ghost is calling them.

D. W. B. ROBINSON.

Sydney.

The Measures of Man's Mind

It is my privilege this evening, and a happy one it is, to deliver the inaugural lecture of the present Session of the Theological Hall, and it gives me particular pleasure because the three full-time teachers at Emmanuel are now my colleagues at the University, as they have been appointed to the staff of the School of Divinity, which was established by the Senate last year, and are members also of the Board of Studies in Divinity which controls the new post-graduate course for the B.D. degree and the Diploma for students who are not graduates.

Can we set limits to the mind of man? In other words: What are the measures of man's mind? . . . Morality and religion demand a relation between man and God which no merely finite being could possess. Man is truly "made in the image of God"; his mind then, human understanding, must be in some degree analogous to the mind of God, for man *does* have glimpses of the Ultimate and the Infinite.

Your mind is your most intimate and personal possession—it is in fact your real "self." Somehow within the mind of man arise and develop those intellectual, artistic, moral and religious dispositions which are the hallmark of personality, and which form a scale of values by means of which we judge what is true and beautiful and good and abiding. The build-up of the human mind is such as enables us to trace its growth from infancy to maturity, from impulses to ideals. Deep within it we find the soul, the spiritual and immortal part of man, the source and origin of all that later becomes intellect, disposition, and character. The soul is the constant inner activity of which one is directly conscious; it determines the course of one's inner life.

First then: What part is played by mind in the struggle for civilisation? This is one of three questions which I shall try to answer.

The struggle to be civilised has been to so great an extent a struggle to control the material forces of nature,

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Inaugural Public Lecture of the Forty-third Session of the Theological Hall, Emmanuel College, Brisbane, on March 4th, 1954, by the Professor of Philosophy in the University of Queensland.

and to bend them to his purpose, that man is apt to forget that the mental factor is as imporant as the material—for the conquest of nature cannot otherwise be based than upon knowledge and understanding. Whereas the savage is bound almost entirely by his material surroundings, civilised man strives to improve his environment and suit it to his needs and use. To be civilised man must not only understand his material surroundings, but also himself, his own powers, his mind, and these are as understandable and subject to law as are the forces of nature . . . War, social revolution, industrial disorder, nervous and mental breakdown—all these facts show that civilisation will fail unless the human mind is understood and mental facts taken account of by those who devise or reform our industrial and social system. Only so far as it seems worth while to the human mind will the struggle of civilisation continue.

In the primitive stages of human development custom, tribal or social, was the sole standard of right conduct, and from the dictates of custom or traditional authority there was no appeal. Progress came gradually as man learnt to control natural forces and apply them directly to the satisfaction of his own needs. Later still, with the change from nomadic to settled life, knowledge began to develop for its own sake rather than because of its immediate practical utility. Consequently in developed societies the chief interest is centred not so much in the acquisition of knowledge as in the critical consideration of the significance of knowledge already achieved and usually taken for granted. Here is a profound difference. The social tradition no longer enjoins blind obedience to custom but rather encourages members of the society to endeavour to achieve clear understanding of all problems, social or personal. So the great mental disciplines come into being—the normative and philosophical sciences (Logic, Aesthetics, and Ethics)—which criticise and evaluate the present achievement of society in knowledge, art, and conduct. These studies are each concerned with one of the ideals of human endeavour—Truth, Beauty, and Goodness.

This leads to the further question and it is complementary to the first: What part is played by mind or consciousness in the life of the individual?

The child is not an individual at birth with a personality ready-made—he is much more a specimen of the race than a person or an individual self. Such consciousness as

he possesses is instinctive and racial: his earliest feelings and instincts are inherited from the race.

As development goes on, consciousness becomes more and more important as a factor in securing the adaptation of primitive impulse to the conditions of learning imposed by the environment. During the period of adolescence the knowledge of the tribe or community is passed on to the individual, and his reaction to any situation is facilitated and perfected by means of the tribal or social learning. The race-consciousness determines whether the individual will succeed in making use of his inherited powers. The environment in turn determines in what direction and to what extent these racial powers shall be developed.

In man arises another capacity—man is not content to accept the conditions imposed by his surroundings; he seeks to understand the world he lives in in order to adapt it to his purposes. Civilised man cannot settle down to a life which is a mere round of instinctive satisfactions; the human intellect very quickly grows weary of monotony and habit. Man's racial (or instinctive) direction is towards creative effort—in a word, progress; but only when the immediate gratification of impulse is postponed, and a surplus of mental energy built up, is creative effort possible. If life is to be happy, or even interesting, if progress it to be maintained, then instinctive gratification must be subordinated to the conscious development of individuality, i.e., of a personal point of view. The attainment of individuality, which means understanding and control both of self and of the environment, is the fundamental necessity of successful living: it makes for liberty of initiative and of judgment.

Not only can man adapt himself to a wider range of environment than any creature—he can reconstruct his environment to suit his own needs: this is due not merely to more favourable conditions of his development—such as prolonged youth and the use of language as the instrument of communication and tradition—but to the mental powers with which he is endowed at birth. In addition to intelligence, i.e., the power to learn, much of the logical structure of the mind (what we call reason) seems to be inborn; and even more important are the capacities for intellectual, artistic, moral, and religious growth—for these are the elements out of which personality is made.

It would be rash, however, to assert that all that is within us must be inherited—there are mental powers still unaccounted for in terms of heredity and environment.

Where do the elements of personality come from? They are the finger of God in every one of us. Personality is the supreme gift which is entirely our own, set high out of reach of those twin busybodies, heredity and environment. . . . The ideal of all human development, I have said, is the achievement of individuality, i.e., being a person. Personality is the present achievement to date of that ideal. We are, or become, persons through our own striving.

In the last half-century man's progress in capacity to control his environment has outrun his capacity for understanding and controlling himself. At the very time when a superior order of living should be more nearly attainable than at any previous stage of the world's history, civilisation seems to be manifesting all the symptoms of speedy disintegration—this because our understanding of human nature has not kept pace with our scientific achievements in the material world. Society in the past, mainly through its apprenticeship system, developed technical and social skills simultaneously in the individual—the social structure was stable and skills firmly established; but in the typical industrial community of to-day the emphasis is upon change and adaptability: or to put it simply, the social order to-day has been changing through material efficiency while human nature has not, and we have yet to acquire the capacity to adapt ourselves to the new conditions of living. The development of technical and of social skills has become unbalanced, and this is proving disastrous. Our failure in this respect finds reflection in the social chaos which is steadily destroying civilised society.[1] The great need in society to-day is for an intelligent assessment of the facts of human organisation, and this will come from the understanding of human nature, the broadening of human interests, and the better appreciation of human values. At present we are technically competent as no other age in history has been; and we combine this with utter social incompetence.

The quality of our civilisation will depend ultimately upon the spiritual element within man which organises his moral interests in the conception of a complete life. Yet this spiritual factor is precisely what in our secular system of education we tend to ignore. The future of humanity must lie in its appreciation of spiritual values. Our civilisation owes something to Greek culture, but most to the practice of the Christian way of living without some

1. Elton Mayo. **The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization** (Harvard. 1954).

understanding of which we shall have but a partial and inadequate view of human greatness and goodness.

And now the final question: How does man as a rational or spiritual being transcend the limits of this world of sense and understanding, and attain knowledge of the Eternal and Infinite?

I shall try to answer this, somewhat unconventionally perhaps, by first discussing *interest*. Interest covers feeling and all varieties of emotion. It is our *attitude* towards an object.

The most frequent and urgent of our interests are those we term intrinsic—our interest in a picture, a poem, a symphony, a story, for its own sake entirely: this is the experience in which we can be *absorbed in* anything. Our interest in learning and in our conduct may be of more social concern—more imperative—and may occupy more of the labour of education; but our primary interest is in things that we enjoy or from which we turn in disgust.

Just as we seek artistic enjoyment as a relief from everyday cares and worries, so our interest in religion is essentially intrinsic—for its own sake. Discussion of religion, however, almost always proceeds as though the doctrinal aspect was fundamental. Since doctrine is largely institutional and consequent upon religious feeling, there is much in it which is difficult to justify on an intellectual basis alone. That is the problem religious apologists are bound to face. It is too often forgotten that a man becomes religious not because he is suddenly convinced of the truth of a doctrine, not because he desires that his conduct shall be better than it has been—he becomes religious because he likes it, because it appeals to him; he finds that one of his chief needs lies in religious emotion and he finds also that if he desires to retain his capacity for appreciating his emotion he must believe in some doctrine and order his life accordingly. Essentially his interest in religion is intrinsic—for its own sake.

The object of our religious interest is God. At first formed in the image of a man, the notion of God develops with our religious beliefs. The thought of a Kingdom of God within us organises our moral interests in the conception of a full individual life: such a life is the ideal of our social system. Religious belief is necessary to morality. Apart from faith in a righteous God Whose commands are, however imperfectly, revealed in the individual conscience, morality would be a matter of mere opinion. It is this

faith which makes man act according to standards which are indubitably right and good.

Knowledge of God is based on faith—as Tennyson says in *In Memoriam:*

> Strong Son of God, immortal love,
> Whom we, that have not seen Thy face,
> By faith, and faith alone, embrace,
> Believing where we cannot prove . . .

The most that the contemplation of nature yields is the possibility of things divine. It is this open possibility that leaves room for faith.[2] Where we understand the facts of experience, we say we know; but where our ideas are beyond the range of possible experience and yet we are confident that they are true, we say we have faith. When Tennyson held in his hand a little flower which he had plucked out of the crannied wall, he thought

> . . . *if* I could understand
> What you are, root and all, and all in all,
> I should know what God and man is.

Such faith as this creates the belief in God and all that follows from that belief: it is not a certainty that is intellectually enforced, but one that is morally achieved. Such a faith ensures in the religious man the realisation of all his ideals. You have this faith when you pray: Thy Kingdom come; Thy will be done.

With faith we must consider religious emotion—a perfectly healthy experience, necessary to the completion and satisfaction of the emotional side of our nature. Let us take some aesthetic experiences analogous to religious emotion:—our response to the artist's symbolism in the painting of the Madonna and Child; the awe of Goethe as he stood and gazed at Strassburg Cathedral—awe which is akin to reverence which we are told by Job and by the Psalmist is the beginning of wisdom; the content of Wordsworth when he found the bliss ineffable:

> I was only then
> Contented, when with bliss ineffable
> I felt the sentiment of being spread
> O'er all that moves and all that seemeth still;
> O'er all that, lost beyond the reach of thought
> And human knowledge, to the human eye
> Invisible, yet liveth to the heart . . .

and the struggle of Carlyle who came at last, he tells us, to find his feet upon the everlasting rock. . . . And true religious feeling can be seen in David who would not drink of the water of the well of Beth-lehem that was by the gate; in the cry of the captives by the rivers of Babylon

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2. James Ward: **Psychological Principles, Ch. XIV.**

who could not sing the Lord's song in a strange land—but on their return from captivity what a change there was: Then was our mouth filled with laughter and our tongue with singing; and there was that deeply moving experience of the two men on the road to Emmaus: Did not our heart burn within us, while He talked with us by the way . . .?

The religious emotion is still to be achieved by those who give themselves up to the inspiration and suggestion of a stately ritual. Doctrines that once roused men to action, or terrified them into penitence, are now heard with good-humoured tolerance—they arouse and terrify no longer. The Church is the proper guardian of past and future human values. . . . Now please don't misunderstand me when I say that the Church is a human institution: I know that the Church is a divine institution—it derives from our Lord Himself; but we must face up to it also as a human institution, a human, and historic, endeavour to understand and to control the facts of the life spiritual. The leaders of the Church must understand, not only the Apostolic Fathers, but also the human material with which they are dealing. Religion cannot build the life spiritual except upon a human foundation. Man has to separate out, as it were, his individuality from the racial material of which it is constructed. Having in part accomplished this, he is immediately compelled to merge the new-found self in the universe again. It is in thought and feeling of this order, that the religious experience, properly so-called takes it rise. It is the churches' function to help man, irrespective of doctrine and creed, to see the universe beyond the narrow circumstances of his daily life. Humanity still retains the capacity to respond, immediately and strongly, to the inspiration of a normal religious experience. The universe for the scientist remains a matter of the intellect and does not necessarily include the man. It is for the church to give the people that vision without which they must perish.

Let us apply what I have said briefly to religious truth. All moral and spiritual truth must be regarded as revealed truth. Those immediate judgements about good and evil in which we have the sole means of knowing the divine character and purposes must be looked upon as divinely implanted knowledge. It cannot come by chance; nor is it a matter of experience. If we believe, for instance, that the Kingdom of God is within us we cannot deny the existence of revelation or conclude that it is irrelevant outside the Bible. Spiritual and moral truth depends on the superior

insight of exceptional minds. There are the Prophets, the Apostles, the Martyrs, and the Saints—there are also, let me add, the Poets; for the philosopher, without the poet's lead, may never see the truth. Wordsworth knew this when he placed the poet with the prophet (for both are inspired):

> If thou indeed derive thy light from Heaven . . .
> Then, to the measure of the light vouchsafed,
> Shine, Poet! in thy place, and be content.

We should not altogether sever the idea of revelation from those particular moral and religious truths which are arrived at through the ordinary workings of the human intellect. The Jewish prophets, e.g., did not arrive at their ideas about God without much hard thinking, though their thoughts are not always explicit and the mode of their expression is often poetic. In the highest instance of all—we do not stop to analyse the way in which Jesus Himself came by the truth He gave to man; the early Christian Church thought of Him as the supreme expression in the moral and religious sphere of the Logos or Reason of God.[3]

I think revelation stands out as the supreme expression of the religious emotion, the highest attainment of the mind of man. It is the measure to knowledge of the Divine. Yet we must judge it to be true and good before we see it as a piece of divine revelation. Reason can give us no knowledge of the great problems of God and Immortality; through sense we can in no way come into contact with them. They are based on faith. But reason can and does enable us to think of them systematically and not inconsistently. So it is that we accept no revelation as true unless it can be independently verified; for sometimes untrue thoughts and wicked suggestions arise in an equally unaccountable way. Christianity alone of the great religions combines an ethical ideal which appeals universally to conscience with a Theism which commends itself to reason; nowhere else is found an infinite eternal spiritual Personality, perfect in goodness and beauty, Who is immanent in the universe yet infinitely transcends it.

All this has its bearing on education. By humanism is meant the study of man in all his relations—as thinker, as artist, and as a social, moral, and religious being. Education requires a foundation of humane studies because they deal with ends. A liberal education should include the pursuit of one or all of the following studies—literature,

3. Hastings Rashdall: **Philosophy and Religion**, Lect. V.

history, philosophy, and theology. They are of intrinsic value; our interest is in them for its own sake; towards them we can maintain the right attitude of mind and that is the disinterested pursuit of truth on its own account and with no thought of incidental advantages. Literature and history can be begun in the schools. We get at the thought and refinement of a people through literature. The lack of appreciation of affairs to-day is directly due to our neglect of history—because we have forgotten it we have had to relive it. . . . Further, religion is the only subject, with the possible exception of art, which can be pursued entirely for its own sake and without regard to material or utilitarian purposes. Higher education is incomplete without religion—that is the means of developing the emotional side of our nature which has so often been neglected.

For reasons such as these a few of us moved for the establishment of a School of Divinity at the University. Courses began last year with twenty students, and there will be twice that number this year. We feel that, with Divinity studies in the curriculum of the Faculty of Arts, the University is now complete. There are three universities in this part of the world offering the Bachelor of Divinity course—Sydney, Otago, and Brisbane. After all, universities owe their origin to religion.

W. M. KYLE.

Brisbane.

Basel and Bultmann, II

(Continued from Vol. XIII, No. 1)

After the philosopher Karl Jaspers we hear now the criticism of the theologian Karl Barth on Bultmann's work. Barth's "Rudolf Bultmann, an effort to understand him" was published as No. 34 of the series *Theologische Studien*. It is really an effort to understand—on every page of it it is clearly visible that the author did his utmost to learn the background and the motives of Bultmann's theology. The older Barth has become milder—he does not attack, but tries to discuss, his mind widely open for the arguments of his partner. It appears to be extremely difficult to understand Bultmann. Not one living author speaks so much about understanding and is so difficult to approach. The discussion around him has become silent lately. One does not know how to continue the discussion with Bultmann.

Bultmann understands the N.T. as the document of a message (*kerugma,* proclamation, preaching). Everyone

who tries to hear this message must know that it is addressed to himself. It is not a general, theoretic exposition about God, world and man, or a neutral historic information about something which happened somewhere. The message involves the hearer in a way of life, so that he takes part in *the life* of the message. The content of the *kerugma* is a unique event captivating people of all times. The Word of God is an act and everyone who hears it begins to know himself. A real interpretation of the New Testament is only possible in partaking in the life of the *kerugma*, in a faithful obedience to it.

Furthermore, the N.T. gives its particular message in a definite historic shape. Jesus Christ is the Word-made-flesh and the *kerugma* about him obtained a definite, historic (fleshly) shape. The man of this century must try to find the essence of the N.T.—he must translate the ways of antique thinking into modern thought. Does Bultmann only speak about the language, the background, the concepts of the message of the N.T.? Does he not deal thoroughly with the message itself? Here Barth puts a number of question marks. In his younger years Bultmann strongly opposed the old *religionsgeschichtliche Schule*. He was one of the leaders of the *formgeschichtliche Schule*, which wanted a new and better understanding and reproduction of the message itself. This school was really concerned about the *content* of the message. Its weakness was that it approached the message with an interest and a knowledge apriori. "The great theme of theology in western culture is for more than two centuries the encounter with the Aufklärung and with the new understanding of man and the world, based upon reason and revelation." The emphasis—Barth says—falls on the *encounter*, and the message itself which is the object (and subject) of all Theology is pushed into a corner. So far Barth in his careful and critical survey of Bultmann's work.

What is—according to Bultmann—the content of the message? His fundamental conception is that man is doubly determined: the *kerugma* reveals the old determination (of which he knew already something by nature) of his existence "in the world, in the flesh," and the new one to which he finds himself called. (1) As a hearer of the message he discovers who he was and who he will be. (2) As a believer in the message he feels himself passing over from the old determination to the new one. (3) In this movement he is the object of God's work: he exists in Christ.

Here again Barth puts a question mark and he asks why Bultmann implicated an existential pre-science, why the *kerugma* of the N.T. only corrects, radicalises this pre-science. Bultmann makes the same mistake as the Old Orthodoxy which abstracted the doctrine of sin from God's redeeming work. I don't know whether Barth is right here although he makes his critical remarks very carefully.

Most of the things Barth says are put as a series of questions to Bultmann. He does not draw many certain conclusions.

What does Bultmann mean with his concept *kerugma?* The *kerugma* has a power in itself. Christ lives in the *kerugma.* His cross and resurrection are as it were repeated in the *kerugma.* The life of Christ is in the *kerugma* and through the *kerugma.* Christology and Soteriology have become one. The N.T. preaches the unity of both. Barth answers: It could perhaps be possible to understand the *kerugma* as Bultmann does, but he goes too far: his soteriology absorbs his christology. The centre of our faith is the life and death of Jesus of Nazareth in the time of Pontius Pilate. *He* is the subject and object of the Christian message.

Bultmann's fundamental theory is the doctrine of the passing-over from the old situation of sin and flesh into the new situation "in Christ." The *kerugma* here and now is the actual event. The connection with the central fact of his cross, his reconciling death in the year 30 is not clearly visible.

In *Kerugma und Mythus* Bultmann says: "It is not salvation, because it is the cross of Christ, but because it is salvation it is the cross of Christ." Barth comments: I would be very pleased to hear the right interpretation of this sentence. Barth cannot agree with an interpretation of the N.T. in which the emphasis falls so strongly on the soteriology, at the cost of the christology. When Bultmann speaks of the cross and the resurrection of Christ he deals much stronger with *the knowledge* of them than with the facts of this death and resurrection in the time of Pontius Pilate. *Das Christusgeshehen* repeats itself in the life of the believer. This is a serious weakening of the message of the N.T.

What about Bultmann's *Entmythologisierung* of the N.T.? This is in itself, to Barth, not a very interesting aspect in comparison with his positive exegetical results and positive principles of exegesis. In this reproduction of

the message Barth misses some characteristic elements. He does not know whether Bultmann as an interpreter and translator wants to *eliminate* these elements. One could perhaps better say that he wants to *transform* them for present-day man. Does what Bultmann wants to transform only belong to the formal side of the N.T.?

Here are the elements Bultmann wants to transform—the world-picture of the late-Jewish and Hellenistic-Gnostic surrounding, e.g., the cosmos in three levels, under the dominance of supernatural powers: Satan and demons, sin and death on the one hand, and God, angels and heavenly-earthly wonders on the other hand. This whole drama moves towards the end of all things in a final cosmic catastrophe. Connected with this world-picture are the concepts of a pre-existent Son of God, of his birth of the virgin, of his reconciling death for the sin of man, of his bodily resurrection from the dead as the beginning of the defeat of Satan, sin and death, of his ascension to be King and Lord, and his visible coming again to finish his work of salvation. The ideas of church, of baptism and the Lord's Supper follow consequently.

Bultmann makes the translation of the N.T. dependent on the right treatment of these elements, which he sometimes eliminates but mostly transforms. Barth cannot accept the way Bultmann and his disciples deal with these elements. Why should they be the centre of their exegetical interest? They are dealt with as a string of curiosities and made into an independent problem. What does Bultmann do with these elements? He is not able to transform the antique world-picture; nor the conception of Satan, demons, and angels; nor the birth of the virgin, the empty grave, the ascension of Christ. But other elements are not eliminated. They are interpreted—sin, death, God and His revelation in Christ (only in Him), the Holy Spirit and believers as children of God, the Church, the sacraments, the eschatological shape as governing principle—all these elements are *re-interpreted* in Bultmann's theology. He does what others as Schleiermacher and Biedermann tried to do before him.

Why do the elements of the N.T. need an interpretation? Bultmann says that nobody in this time can understand it if we don't shell the message out of its mythical bark. Myth, mythical speaking, is, according to Bultmann, everywhere, when divine things are pictured as human, when things which don't belong to the visible

world are pictured as visible, when non-objects are dealt with as objects. The powers which determine human life are pictured in the forms of the myth. That is why the N.T. needs a new interpretation, because these mythological forms are non-Christian. We must translate these forms into modern ones.

Here Barth goes hand in hand with Jaspers when he says that the twentieth century forms of human thought which Bultmann chooses are found in the existential philosophy, and especially in Heidegger's work. Is Heidegger's understanding of modern man and his background so tremendously important that our interpretation of the N.T. could be determined by his work? The whole concept of "mythological" and Bultmann's definition in this respect are too formal. The real myth is always a tale of a "super-human," "godly" character, in which some general relations and events within the natural-historic world are told. Did the N.T. writers proclaim a message of general cosmic relations in the shape of a tale of super-human, godly character? Could our concept of the myth ever become the canon for our interpretation of the N.T.? Certainly, Barth says, we must translate, we must interpret, we must be aware of the antique world-picture and of the spiritual surrounding of the N.T. era. But the One, who in the N.T. is called "God," becomes visible, comes into human flesh. He appears to be able to do this. The first disciples were witnesses of the loneliness of the word-made-flesh on the cross, and also of the glory of this word-made-flesh in the resurrection. God lives a human life within the limitations of our world. And this is the origin of our faith. Our faith is not in spite of the event, but because of the event. The incarnation is the ground of our faith.

To what extent is the N.T. open for an interpretation as far as these problematic elements are concerned? In which transformation must these elements appear? Bultmann answers: honest exegesis, dogmatics, preaching, can and must be *existentiale** interpretation of the N.T., i.e., such an interpretation which aims at the special Christian human self-understanding. The N.T. Message and the myth as the form of it is an expression of human self-understanding. The myth as the form of the N.T. message and the myth in itself have a structural affinity: both ask for an *existentiale* interpretation. "Existential" means "related to the self-understanding of the human existence."

*The German words "existential" and "existentell" must not be exchanged.

Man to-day does not think any longer in *mythical*, but in *anthropological* forms. Bultmann says that the only way to confront modern man with the actual *scandalon* and to protect him from the *scandalon* that is not genuine is this new interpretation in anthropological forms. Only so can he decide between faith and unbelief.

Everyone who has to preach the Gospel must deal with these problems of interpretation and therefore the keen interest in the study of these problems is a benefit for the whole Church. Barth, however, is afraid that Bultmann and his disciples think they are able to solve all problems by a philosophic key. And the "key" is not a servant, but a queen! They use the philosophy of the earlier Martin Heidegger. From him the concepts originate of "the self-understanding a priori," of the antithesis of *Uneigentlichkeit* and *Eigentlichkeit*, or *Verfuegbarkeit* and *Unverfuegbarkeit*, or "past" and "future." Should we really approach the N.T. with an anthropology in this structure? The centre of the N.T. is God's act in Christ and here is no understanding a priori. Bultmann agrees in this respect, but why does he approach the rest of the message from the side of this anthropology, i.e., Heidegger's anthropology.

The old Church used the concepts of Aristotle and the Aufklärung the concepts of Hegel, but is the existentialism of Heidegger representative for our time? Heidegger himself has passed the stage of his earlier anthropological convictions. America has not yet discovered existentialism and Russia disdains it as the philosophy of the bourgeois.

Bultmann's definition of the myth is wrong: it is not an expression of a human self-understanding, but much more the expression of transcendental realities. The theologian Karl Barth asks: what must become of the proclamation of the N.T. if we grasp it totally in the tongs of the human self-understanding, which, according to Bultmann, finds its expression in it? We must honour Bultmann that he broke through the schemes of existentialism as far as christology is concerned. The central fact in the N.T. is God's act in Christ for man. Christ is the subject of everything which happens in the life of the individual believer and of the Church as a whole. But for the rest it is nearly impossible to recognise in his existential schemes the real message of the N.T. Bultmann's existentialism has a *fundamental* significance for his theology, and so he will never be able to interpret the N.T.

M. W. J. GEURSEN.

Melbourne.

Book Reviews

THE NEW BIBLE COMMENTARY.

Edited by the Rev. Professor F. Davidson, assisted by the Rev. A. M. Stibbs and the Rev. E. F. Kevan (I.V.F.), 1953, pp. 1199; 45/- (Australian).

This is a remarkable publishing venture. In these days when the impecunious student is accustomed to expect less and less for more and more, the very amplitude and magnitude of this volume is a matter for pious exclamation.

This volume is designed as a serious commentary on the actual text of Holy Scripture. For too long commentaries have tended to devote a disproportionate amount of space to speculative and critical problems to the neglect of the weightier matters of exegesis: exposition and proclamation. This complaint cannot be levelled at this commentary. It does attempt to grapple with the actual text in both its historical context and in theological meaning. The Editors write: "By deliberate choice, it has been felt unnecessary to devote any considerable amount of space to source analysis, arbitrary criticism and speculative theory which so dominate many publications." At the same time the Editors hasten to add that it has not been their intention simply to produce a volume containing extensive devotional or homiletical notes. On the contrary, it has been their aim "to help many to gain from God's written Word fresh and increasing understanding of the ways of God and of his will for men."

It is apparent, however ,that the conception is somewhat better than its execution. In some cases joint authorship reveals that articles written by one scholar have been revised and partially rewritten by another. It would appear that the Editors have had to wrestle with some difficult and delicate problems in regard both to conciliation and adaptation.

Fifty contributors are listed, the majority of whom are comparatively unknown. It is not without interest to note the denominational affiliations of the contributors: while Anglican, Baptist and Presbyterian Churches are represented, the Methodist Church is without a single representative.

It is gratifying to note the inclusion of two Australians; the Reverend D. W. B. Robinson (who writes on Obadiah and Jonah), and the Reverend Dr. L. L. Morris (who writes on I, II and III John). Both these writers are contributors to this Review. Their individual contributions are among the most lucid and helpful in this Commentary, and are fine examples of competent Exangelical scholarship.

The publishers are to be congratulated on an ambitious undertaking which has been commendably achieved. Serious students of the Bible will have cause to be grateful for this further and exact study of the text of the English Bible.

S. BARTON BABBAGE.

Melbourne.

GOD HIDDEN AND REVEALED.

By John Dillenberger. Foreword by Professor Paul Tillich. (Muhlenberg Press, Philadelphia) 1953. $2.50, pp. 193.

Dr. Dillenberger, Associate Professor of Religion at Columbia University, is one of a group of younger American theologians—Dr. E. Charbonnier of Barnard College, Dr. R. Shinn of Yale Divinity School, and Dr. D. D. Williams of Chicago are others—from whom we are going to hear a good deal in the future.

The motivating problem of the book is the question of the relation of God's hiddenness to His revelation. The writer attacks the problem historically by reviewing analytically and critically the interpretation given to Luther's notion of *deus absconditus* by Ritschl and the Ritschlian historians, Loofs and Harnack, Holl and Kattenbusch. Ritschl's own position is that the love of God revealed in Christ, who is the founder of the perfect spiritual and moral religion, constitutes the content of revelation. Revelation is no unveiling of a mystery but the appearance in the explicit self-consciousness of man of something of which he had been somehow aware all along. On these terms, there is no place for God's hiddenness, though Luther's interest in the subject is discussed by Ritschl. The *deus absconditus*, consequently, is rejected by Ritschl and the Ritschlians as a legacy from scholastic thought.

R. Otto, who admits his indebtedness to Ritschl and the Ritschlians for their research into Luther's thought, nevertheless employs the latter to develop his own conception of the hiddenness of God in terms of the terribleness of God as one stands before His majesty.

A completely new departure in the interpretation of the relation of the revelation of God in Christ to God's hiddenness comes with the neo-Reformation theology of Brunner and Barth; and Dr. Dillenberger carefully distinguishes the different positions which they occupy on this central question for theology. For Brunner, apart from revelation, God is *deus absconditus*, the hidden God, and He is known by man as the angry God. In revelation God is no longer hidden, even though He is not fully known. He is love but He is holy love. Barth, as is well known, maintains that God is known only in Jesus Christ. God's hiddenness is evident only on the basis of revelation; so that we can never begin from hiddenness, i.e., with the impossibility of knowing God, but with a word of gratitude that God had made Himself known to us. So all suggestions concerning natural knowledge of God or a point of contact are in the long run irrelevant.

The work concludes with a new approach, based on the previous analysis of hiddenness and revelation, to such long-standing problems as the relation of natural to revealed theology, or reason to revelation, of transcendence and immanence, in which the writer's main contention is that for us now the issue is no longer that of Liberalism versus neo-Orthodoxy, but of advancing beyond neo-Orthodoxy to the establishing of a constructive relation between theology and 'the other enterprises of human activity" such as culture, philosophy and history of religion.

Here is a book of tremendous contemporary value on at least two scores:—(1) It opens to us a question that is not normally dealt with in routine courses on the Reformation, namely, the relation of Luther to the scholastic culture in which he was early reared. The question is too often lost sight of in those presentations of Luther which regard him as little more than a social or political agitator. (2) It introduces us to a whole body of theological literature in German which is very much neglected in the English-speaking parts of the world—that of the Ritschlian historians. It consequently provides us with a new approach to the Barth-Brunner controversy.

One or two points of criticism may be raised, which do not, however, detract from the over-all appreciation of the book by the present reviewer of the excellence of it. (1) From the point of view of achieving its purpose as a critique of varied interpretations of Luther,

the book might well have begun with a fuller account of Luther's views on the hiddenness of God. The author plainly has all the material at his command to give such an account, and his expository powers are such that it would have been well done by him. (2) It is scarcely necessary in a work of this academic nature to translate every Latin phrase, e.g., *deus ignotus*. This is all the less desirable when the actual translation is bad, e.g., *terminus a quo* is translated as "point from which" on p. 119. (3) From an otherwise comprehensive bibliography it is noteworthy that Gunther Dehn's "Man and Revelation" is omitted, for it has much relevant material on the very subject of this book. (4) On p. 114, three lines from the foot of the text, the final "s" of *absolutas* should be deleted and on the next line the final "s" of *ordinatas*. (5) One wonders whether a final protest may be allowed against the grammatical form "different *than*".

JOHN McINTYRE.

St. Andrew's College,
The University of Sydney.

THE HOPE OF JESUS.

By Roderic Dunkerley (Longmans Green) 1953, pp. 221, 18/9 (Aus.)

This is what the author calls a statement of "the logical outcome" of the main thesis of the late Dr. C. J. Cadoux's "The Historic Mission of Jesus" (1941). He considers that the dramatic nature of Cadoux's interpretation of the ministry of Jesus demands a much more vigorous response from N.T. scholars either by way of acceptance and the consequent working out of its far-reaching implications or by conclusive refutation.

He epitomises Cadoux's position thus: "He posits two fundamental facts as of primary importance and maintains they are bound to affect very profoundly our view of the purpose and hope of Jesus. 'The two facts in question are these: firstly Jesus' expectation, at the beginning of his ministry, that he would be accepted and followed as Messiah by Israel, not repudiated and martyred; and secondly, his deep interest and concern over the dangerous mutual attitude of Israel and Rome, and his strenuous efforts to avert the threatened clash of arms between them.'" Primary (and for Cadoux and Dunkerley, conclusive) evidence are the three passages in which Jesus laments (near the beginning of his ministry) over the Galilean towns which did not repent (Luke 10:13-15; Matt. 11:20-24 Q); mourns over Jerusalem (in the middle period) (Luke 13:34; Matt. 23-27 Q); and weeps over the city as he approached it for the last time (Luke 19:41-44 L). All express profound disappointment, unrealised hopes and expectations. The implication drawn by Dunkerley-Cadoux is that he had expected almost universal acceptance of the proclaimed Kingdom, leading to the moral, not military, conquest of the Roman Empire, and the establishment of an era of peace and goodwill on earth. Disappointment "meant deep agony to him as he saw what it involved; it led directly to their murder of him. His death was not purposed by God—murder is never God's will." This meant the indefinite postponement of "the Golden Age."

Dunkerley deals quite unconvincingly with the obvious difficulties of this interpretation—(a) that Jesus did not realise the full significance of the Suffering Servant passages in Isaiah till late in his ministry; (b) that the Cross was not part of God's eternal purpose; (c) its

failure to realise the whole glory and shame of the Cross that it was in fact murder; (d) the quite inadequate conception of the Kingdom as fully embodiable in a new "Golden Age" conceived primarily in moral and political terms, and a host of others.

The book has the merit of reminding us forcibly that there still are, as in the days of Christ's ministry, unlimited possibilities for contemporary man and the contemporary world, if and when he turns wholeheartedly in faith to God. "What might have been," in this "acceptable year of the Lord" is still what may yet be.

J. C. ALEXANDER.

Melbourne.

THE HOUSEHOLD OF GOD: Lectures on the Nature of the Church. By Leslie Newbigin (S.C.M. Press) 1953, pp. 155; 12/6.

Three answers may be given to the question, "What is the manner of our ingrafting into Christ?" They may be called generally the "Protestant" (which emphasises the place of faith), the "Catholic" (which emphasises sacramental participation in the life of a continuing organism) and the "Pentecostal" (which emphasises the need of receiving and abiding in the Holy Spirit.)

Statements of the Biblical basis for each of these answers, and of its strength and its weakness, constitute the three central chapters of this book, which has also an introductory chapter which outlines the factors making the doctrine of the Church central in theological discussion to-day, and two concluding chapters which consider the significance of the fact that the Church is on its way to the end of time and the ends of the earth.

Newbigin's own experience as a missionary and a bishop colours at every vital point what he has to say. And that is a good thing; for where is the doctrine of the Church being more eagerly discussed, and better understood, than among those whose witness must be made in an unsympathetic environment, and who are intent upon building an indigenous Church while still recognising, and actually experiencing, that they are one with Christians everywhere?

It is true, as the author himself says in the Preface, that there are few references to the literature of the subject; and there are places where some references would have strengthened the argument. But the book will provide a valuable introduction to the many questions related to the "marks" by which the Church is known; and it will make its readers, of all points of view, aware of a certain pharisaism in their regard of those who belong to denominational groups other than their own.

Misprints occur on pages 97 ("soveriegn" for "sovereign") and 139 ("unto" for "into.") The italicised "zoe aionios" on page 120 should have been printed in Greek characters, or else translated, and may be excused, for its marring of what is an excellently printed volume, only because it occurs in a quotation.

They were happy thoughts which led the Committee of the Kerr Lectureship to invite Newbigin to deliver the 1952 series, and the Foreign Mission Committee of the Church of Scotland to make it possible for him to devote a good deal of his furlough to their preparation. The resulting publication is one for which many will be grateful.

Brisbane. J. F. PETER.

PASCALS BILD VOM MENSCHEN.
By Arthur Rich (Zwingli-Verlag, Zuerich), 1953, pp. 214; Fr.13.95.

It is nearly three hundred years since Blaise Pascal died at the early age of thirty-nine, leaving a few works which established him as one of the great original minds of all time. During these centuries innumerable books have appeared dealing with various aspects of his life and thought, biographies, accounts of his mathematical and physical discoveries, studies of his religious sentiments and theological opinions, analyses of his superb prose style, etc. It might well seem that everything has been said that could be said about him. But the secret of Pascal is one with which every generation must wrestle afresh, and the changing interests of each new generation send men back to a renewed study of Pascal's profound thought.

In our own day no question is more eagerly debated than that of the nature of man, nor is any of greater importance. In the course of this debate there have been occasional references to Pascal but, so far as I am aware, no thorough treatment of his views. This has been remedied by this latest study of Pascal in which Dr. Arthur Rich of the University of Zuerich gives a scholarly account of Pascal's doctrine in a work which is of first importance to students of both Pascal and the doctrine of man.

Dr. Rich confines his study to the Pensees and seeks to present a systematic exposition of what seems at first sight to be a mere heterogeneous collection of fragments. In the course of this study it becomes clear that the fragmentariness lies in the expression and not in the thought. Dr. Rich lays bare an inner unity which draws together the apparently contradictory statements, and this is the dialectic of nature and grace. Seen from this central viewpoint all that Pascal has to say about man in the Pensees falls into order.

Dr. Rich begins with a careful analysis of the three orders of reality of which Pascal speaks, especially in the famous Fragment 793 (in the Brunschvicg edition); that of the physical world; that of the human spirit; and that of the love and grace of God. This leads to a discussion of Pascal's use of analogy and its distinction from the Thomist doctrine of the "analogia entis," and opens the way for a discussion of the central element in Pascal's thought, the dialectic of nature and grace. Then follow three chapters in which there are valuable discussions of Pascal's view of human nature, his theory of knowledge, and his analysis of man's fallen nature and the way to its restoration. From every one of these chapters there is much to be learnt that is of the utmost consequence, not only for our understanding of human nature, but also of the Christian faith. A closing chapter gathers together the results of the inquiry showing how man is inescapably bound to God through grace, a grace which for fallen man means the fearful dialectic of judgment which, by an inner necessity, turns good into evil, but a grace which, for the man who finds redemption in Christ, becomes the dialectic of love which turns evil into good. "So it happens that Pascal always speaks of God when he speaks of man, and always speaks of man when he speaks of God. The connection with the grace of God constitutes the unity of human nature, and the schism which appears in actuality is the existential expression of the fact that man has lost the God of grace."

This is a notable book, rich in insight, and a most stimulating contribution to the contemporary discussion on the nature of man.

Dunedin. JOHN HENDERSON.

THE THIRD CONFERENCE ON FAITH AND ORDER, LUND.
Edited by Oliver F. Tomkins (S.C.M.), 1953, pp. 300; 21/-.

There was general agreement among the participants at the World Conference on Faith and Order at Lund that no further substantial progress was possible by the simple expedient of enumerating differences, and that a new and radical departure was necessary, if further progress was to be made. There was an undercurrent of frustration at the impasse which appeared to have been reached. Professor Edmund Schlink said: "There may be some truth in speaking of a 'crisis.' For the Faith and Order Movement finds itself, it seems to me, in a crisis concerning its method. This method has been a systematic and comprehensive interdenominational comparison, by which we tried to elaborate a maximum of the Faith we all hold in common. . . . Nevertheless we have now arrived at a limit to the use of this method."

The realisation grew that, although social and cultural factors were real causes making for division, the problems were basically theological and particularly christological.

It was noticed that the process of "Ecumenical conversation" had resulted, paradoxically, in the hardening of confessional loyalty. Archbishop Brilioth, in his Presidential Address, pointed out that, in the early days, there was "a certain tendency to gloss over differences by formulas that could be interpreted differently," whereas now "it is remarkable that the Ecumenical Movement has had as a parallel, perhaps as a result, a great revival of confessional loyalties."

Reformed Theologians will note with interest that Faith and Order discussions are, under the pressure of World events, becoming more theological and eschatological. The volume before us is a document of historic significance. It is excellently produced, and the record of day to day developments, together with the transcript of addresses, is illuminating and revealing.

Not even the most casual reader can fail to note the difference in emphasis, and in depth, between the contributions of those who spoke out of conditions of catastrophe and crisis, and the contributions of those who spoke out of conditions of comfort and comparative security. Dr. Winifred E. Garrison complained, "I have seldom conversed at any length with any British or Continental European Theologian who did not indicate sooner or later that he recognised the definite quality of 'Americanismus' in the religious thought and practice of my compatriots—a quality obviously derived from the social fluidity, the cultural immaturity, the impatience of restraint, the individualistic concept of liberty, or the zest for action, growth and material gain, all of which are seen as characteristics of what is, relatively, a frontier situation." The justice of this criticism and comment is, however, borne out by the material before us in this volume. Dr. Joseph Hromadka, who followed Doctor Harrison, said that he found the issues which he debated simply "irrelevant." "We are realising," he said, "what it means (theologically speaking) to walk between life and death."

It may prove, in the long run, that this "confrontation" is the most valuable thing which has arisen out of these Conferences on Faith and Order. There may be hope for Anglo-Saxon theologians if, in penitence and humility, they allow themselves to be exposed to the searching Word which God is speaking to his servants in the midst of a day of judgment.

S. BARTON BABBAGE.

Melbourne.

SHORTER NOTICES.

Mercy and Sacrifice. A Study of the Book of Hosea, by Norman Snaith (S.C.M., 7/6). This is a most stimulating re-examination of the main ideas in Hosea. Dr. Snaith has continued with the valuable word-studies he began in "The Distinctive Ideas of the O.T." and has analysed most particularly *chesed,* and the various words for sacrifice in the light of Hosea's utterances. What matter if few of us will agree with the argument that Hosea was chronologically "first of the prophets." Dr. Snaith has called us to rethink this deeply religious prophetic message in the light of the total biblical revelatiion.

Genesis I-XI, by Alan Richardson (S.C.M. 7/6). The latest of the Torch Commentaries is surely one of the most valuable to appear so far. Here at last we have a theologian of repute breaking with the type of exegesis that, for nearly a century, has sought to expound Genesis in an "up-to-date" manner, vis-a-vis the latest archælogical and anthropological knowledge of modern man. Richardson treats Genesis *theologically,* as the Word of God to man. The great and ultimate things that God has to say can only come home to man in picture language, timeless pictures, as only the parables of Christ are timeless. The whole question of the meaning of the word "revelation" as applied to the O.T. is hotly debated to-day, so that Richardson's discussion of the early chapters as "Parables" is only an interim exposition. The chief value of the book, however, is in the Commentary on the text, in which the author seeks to expound theologically (and most preachably!) in the manner that von Rad and other Germans have been doing since the war.

Prophet and Priest in Old Israel, by A. C. Welch (Blackwell, 10/6). At first glance this book seems slight and inconsequential. Yet in a brilliant argument and with incisive freshness the author makes crystal clear what the student of the O.T. has scarcely yet realised, that Israel's cult was not separable from its prophetic interpretation by the great prophets. Nor were the prophets at war with the cult, but only with various misunderstandings of its nature and purpose. This little book, reissued after 17 years, is of great value for the present-day discussion of the O.T. background of the intention of Jesus, both as heritor of the prophetic conception of God's purposes with Israel, as well as epitomising in his own sacrificial death the cult whose roots go back to Moses.

G. A. F. Knight.

The Evangelicals at Oxford, 1735-1871. A record of an unchronicled movement, by J. S. Reynolds (Blackwell, 25/-). This is a painstaking study. The facts have been laboriously collected and faithfully recorded. The result is a useful and revealing record of evangelical activity in Oxford. The author shows that there was a continuing evangelical witness. This witness was neither insignificant nor unimportant, and numbered among its supporters some men of outstanding ability. It was the loss of intellectual leadership and the development of pietism (with the rise of Brethrenism) that finally led to the depressing eclipse of the Evangelical cause. This book is a useful corrective to the prevalent picture of Oxford as the University destitute of evangelical witness.

Asking Them Questions. A Selection from the Three Series. Edited by Ronald Selby Wright (Oxford, 8/). This represents the distilled wisdom of the previous volumes. The best articles are very good indeed. This volume of essays has the merit that it deals with real questions. The questions were asked by senior adolescent boys at

the St. Giles' Cathedral Club, and the writers have endeavoured to deal with the problems raised. The subject matter is at least "relevant"! This is a good example of "apologetics." One's judgment on this achievement, however, will be determined (a) by one's conception of the place of apologetics; and (b) by one's approval or otherwise of the presuppositions of the several contributors.

Basic Economical Problems. A Christian Approach, by John S. Sleeman (S.C.M., 10/6). This is a courageous and commendable attempt to break new ground. The author, who is Lecturer in Social Economics in the University of Glasgow, discusses helpfully the development of free enterprise and the alternatives before us; a totally planned economy, or a general framework of planning in which free enterprise still functions. This general economic discussion is, in effect, but prologue to a discussion of relevant Christian axioms. This section is both constructive and helpful. The author rejects the arguments of those who would contract out of the present system into mediævalism or monasticism on the one hand, or totalitarianism on the other.

The Transcendent Unity of Religion, by Frithjof Schuon (Faber 21/-). The author describes this work as a study in "metaphysics": it might equally well be described as a study in "mysticism," but a mysticism which is both gnostic and esoteric. Speaking of the Sacrament, the author writes: "If it be true that the Eucharist is a means of grace of primordial importance, this is because it emanates from a universal Reality, from which it draws all its own reality; but if this be so, the Eucharist, like all other corresponding means of grace in other traditional forms, cannot be unique, since a universal Reality cannot have one manifestation only to be exclusion of any others, so in that case it would not be universal." The main body of the work is a syncretistic account of Christianity and Mohammedanism in their "inner realities." The charge of syncretism is repudiated. The publishers, however, state, "It is perhaps not too much to say that 'The Transcendent Unity of Religion' represents the highest attainment until now in the comparative and synthetic study of Oriental and Occidental Religion." Students of Comparative Religion will find that the author is a follower of Rene Guenon.

S. Barton Babbage.

Companion to Congregational Praise, edited by K. L. Parry, with Notes on the Music by E. Routley (Independent, 30/-). This follows the general plan and arrangement of the Handbook to the Church Hymnary, to which it is largely indebted. As a commentary on the latest British hymnary, it provides a rich contemporary thesaurus on hymns and authors, tunes and composers. Thus, following the latest evidence, the words and tune of *Adeste Fideles* are attributed to John Francis Wade of Douai and the tune Crimond to Jessis Seymour Irvine of Crimond, Buchan. One characteristic of the volume is the high appreciation of old Reformation and Scottish Psalm tunes. This indicates a recent general trend, beyond Presbyterian and even Protestant borders, as indicated in the work and influence of the late Dr. R. R. Terry in the Roman Communion. *The Companion* is excellently produced and should elicit more than denominational interest.

Essays in Orthodox Dissent, by Bernard Lord Manning (Independent, 7/6). Originally published in 1939, and reviewed at length in one of our earlier issues, this reprint of this important and significant book is most welcome. A high Calvinist Churchman, Manning, in antithetical terms, sets out his central thesis: "The Church is the creation, not the proprietor, of the Good News. The Gospel is

not what the Church proclaims: the Church is that which proclaims the Gospel." Here we have acute historical analysis and discrimination combined with the incisive theological insights of a P. T. Forsyth and the scintillating style of a G. K. Chesterton.

A Layman in the Ministry and *More Sermons of a Layman,* by B. L. Manning (Independent, 7/6 each). These sermons and addresses evidence keen exegetical insight, doctrinal solidity and clarity of expression. They are to be highly evaluated as tested by the author's own admirable definition of preaching as "a manifestation of the Incarnate Word, from the Written Word, by the spoken word." These volumes are reprints of the original publications of 1942 and 1944 respectively.

Muhammad at Mecca, by W. Mongomery Watt (Oxford University Press, 33/6, Aus.) This volume gives fresh consideration to the economic and sociological aspects of the early Mohammedan movement to the Hijrah. The interesting and important fact emerges that young Islam was essentially a movement of young men who were beginning to feel that they were underprivileged. "It was not so much a struggle between 'haves' and 'have nots' as between 'haves' and 'nearly haves.'" (p. 96.) The author, nevertheless, concludes that the movement was genuinely religious. "In a sense the great work of Islam was to modify the nomadic ethics for use in settled conditions; and the key to this was a new principle of organisation for society. . . . Its kernel was the conception of the prophet as a focus of integration." (p. 153). This is an objective, well documented, and illuminating work.

Scheeben's Doctrine of Divine Adoption, by E. H. Palmer (J. H. Kok, Kampen, Netherlands). It is only since the close of World War I that Mathias Joseph Scheeben, who died at Cologne in 1888, has become widely recognised in the Church of Rome as "the best exponent of the new scholasticism, the theologian of the *Uebernatur,* the greatest Mariologian of our times, and the greatest dogmatician of the nineteenth century" (p.11). Scheeben was "original in the traditional." He interprets God's adoption, presupposing an intrinsic worth in the adopted one, as more closely akin to natural sonship than human adoption. In *gratia creata* (*sanctificans*) received sacramentally, the soul becomes like *actus purus.* This essential adoption confers a certain similarity to, but not a substantial union with God. The latter, Scheeben holds, in *gratia increata,* the Holy Spirit effects in a real, substantial, organic union similar to that between form and matter. It is in this conception of "fuller" adoption, depending upon Greek rather than Latin tradition, that he differs from the general Roman view with its sole stress on *gratia sanctificans.* Palmer trenchantly critices Scheeben as filling a Biblical conception with Aristotelian contents and thus repudiates the fundamental prop of sanctifying grace and his distinctive doctrine of union with (as distinct from the indwelling of) the Holy Spirit. Moreover Scheeben starts off on the wrong foot in defining adoption in terms of sonship. He has "put the cart before the horse: he makes adoption dependent upon sanctifying grace. In reality, however, real adoption depends upon Jesus Christ alone, and from that flows our sanctification. Jesus Christ and not sanctification is the basis of adoption. .*Sola Fide* and *sola gloria,*" (p. 190). This thorough piece of research, by a young American Reformed theologian, was presented for the doctor's degree at the Free University of Amsterdam.

Miracles Yesterday and Today, True and False, by B. B. Warfield (Erdmans $3.50). This is a reprint of *Counterfeit Miracles,* originally published in 1918, but now long unprocurable. The central thesis is

that the charismata were distinctively the authentication of the Apostles and belonged therefore exclusively to their age. The once common Anglican position that the miraculous powers continued, on a declining scale, through the period of the Church's weak infancy, to be finally withdrawn only when Christianity ascended the throne of the Empire, is refuted by the evidence. Instead of a regular progressing decrease there was rather a steady growing increase of miracle working from the post Apostolic age. Warfield discusses at length patristic, mediæval and modern 'miracles," and concludes they largely represent pagan modes of thought in the Church and may generally be explained in terms of the natural, delusion or deceit. Here is a very useful exposition of the orthodox Protestant position by an eminent theologian.

Modern Uncertainty and Christian Faith, by G. C. Berkouwer (Eerdmans, $1.50). The first of the Calvin Foundation Lectures delivered at Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1952, are embodied in this small volume. The subjects briefly touched on include the authority of the Scriptures, the nature of the Reformation, the Christian Faith in an uncertain world, and Jesus Christ and His Church. Throughout there is emphasised "the inseparable connection between the sceptre and the King himself. If Holy Scripture becomes a problem in the Church of Christ, then Christ inevitably becomes a problem too." (p. 84). These popular lectures constitute a sustained and powerful argumentation for the primacy of the truth of the Gospel.

R. Swanton.

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